Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality
AbstractOn the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction based on reciprocity and fairness, avoidance of circular concepts in step by step strategic reasoning, ex-post rationality and learning direction theory, presence of both adaptive and analytic approaches to repeated decision tasks, and the absence of quantitative expectations and optimization in typical repeated game strategies
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Selten, Reinhard, . "Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Serie B 421, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Nov 1997.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Keser, Claudia, 1997. "SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-24, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Selten,Reinhard & Mitzkewitz,Michael & Uhlich,Gerald, .
"Duopoly strategies programmed by experienced players,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
106, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Reinhard Selten & Michael Mitzkewitz & Gerald R. Uhlich, 1997. "Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 517-556, May.
- Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 171-98.
- Ball, Sheryl B. & Bazerman, Max H. & Carroll, John S., 1991. "An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-22, February.
- Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
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