Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Reuben, Ernesto

    ()
    (Columbia University)

  • Suetens, Sigrid

    ()
    (Tilburg University)

Abstract

We use a novel experimental design to disentangle strategically- and non-strategically-motivated cooperation. By using contingent responses in a repeated sequential prisoners' dilemma with a known probabilistic end, we differentiate end-game behavior from continuation behavior within individuals while controlling for expectations. This design allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the so-called end-game effect. Experiments with two different subject pools indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic and that the extent to which end-game effects are driven by strategically-cooperating individuals depends on the profitability of cooperation.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4107.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4107.

as in new window
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Experimental Economics, 2012, 15 (1), 24-43
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4107

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: strong reciprocity; strategic cooperation; conditional cooperation; reputation building;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
  2. Reinhard Selten & Michael Mitzkewitz & Gerald R. Uhlich, 1997. "Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 517-556, May.
  3. Laurent Muller & Martin Sefton & Richard Steinberg & Lise Vesterlund, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2005-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  4. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Laury, Susan K., 2002. "Private costs and public benefits: unraveling the effects of altruism and noisy behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 255-276, February.
  5. Vyrastekova, J. & Onderstal, A.M., 2005. "The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2005-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Lacomba, Juan A. & Lagos, Francisco & Reuben, Ernesto & van Winden, Frans, 2014. "On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 40-57.
  7. Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2009. "Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 785-812, July.
  8. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  9. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2008. "Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 2491, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
  11. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  12. Pedro Dal B�, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December.
  13. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
  14. Andreoni, J. & Miller, J.H., 1991. "Rational Cooperative in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Experimental Evidence," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9102, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  15. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-29, February.
  16. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2006. "Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 122247000000001050, www.najecon.org.
  17. Gachter, Simon & Falk, Armin, 2002. " Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(1), pages 1-26.
  18. Brandts, J. & Charness, G., 1998. "Hot Vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 424.98, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  19. François Cochard & Marc Willinger, 2005. "Fair Offers in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship with Hidden Actions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(286), pages 225-240, 05.
  20. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Papers in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 726, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  21. Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert L. Slonim, 2001. "Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-W13, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  22. Marwell, Gerald & Ames, Ruth E., 1981. "Economists free ride, does anyone else? : Experiments on the provision of public goods, IV," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 295-310, June.
  23. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
  24. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  25. Croson, Rachel T. A., 1996. "Partners and strangers revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 25-32, October.
  26. Simon Gaechter & Elke Renner, 2006. "The Effects of (Incentivized) Belief Elicitation in Public Good Experiments," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2006-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  27. Huck, Steffen & Ruchala, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2006. "Competition Fosters Trust," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6009, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
  29. Andereoni, J., 1988. "Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning In Public Goods Experiments," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 375, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  30. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  31. Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, . "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  32. Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2005. "Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions," IZA Discussion Papers 1635, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  33. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
  34. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
  35. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 51-68, January.
  36. Rand, David G & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," Scholarly Articles 11223697, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  37. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  38. Timothy N. Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 1998. "Social Influence in the Sequential Dictator Game," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics archive-37, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  39. Katok, Elena & Sefton, Martin & Yavas, Abdullah, 2002. "Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 89-103, May.
  40. Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
  41. Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, 2006. "Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1918-1923, December.
  42. Normann, Hans-Theo & Wallace, Brian, 2011. "The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment," DICE Discussion Papers 19, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  43. Abbink, Klaus, 2004. "Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: an experimental study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 887-906, November.
  44. Croson, Rachel T. A., 2000. "Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 299-314, March.
  45. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January.
  46. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
  47. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Chun-Lei Yang, 2003. "The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, June.
  48. Engle-Warnick, Jim & Slonim, Robert L., 2004. "The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 553-573, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Petrie, Ragan & Jacobson, Sarah, 2013. "Favor Trading in Public Good Provision," Department of Economics Working Papers 2013-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  2. Loukas Balafoutas & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2012. "Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment," Working Papers 2012-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  3. Fischbacher, Urs & Gächter, Simon & Quercia, Simone, 2012. "The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 897-913.
  4. Dreber-Almenberg, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2014. "Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics," Scholarly Articles 11923167, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Müller, Wieland & Tan, Fangfang, 2013. "Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 658-674.
  6. Johnsen, Åshild A & Kvaløy, Ola, 2014. "You always meet twice: An experiment on intrinsic versus instrumental reciprocity," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2014/2, University of Stavanger.
  7. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4107. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.