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Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments

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Author Info
Jim Engle-Warnick () (Nuffield College, Oxford)
Robert L. Slonim () (Dept of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University)

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Abstract

This paper is an empirical study, using new experimental data, of repeated game strategies in trust games; its goal is to identify strategies that people use in repeated games. We develop a strategy inference method that maps observed actions to a set of best fitting unobserved repeated game strategies. Data analysis shows the ability of the method to infer distinct but intuitive and theoretically justified sets of strategies across finitely and indefinitely repeated games. In indefinitely repeated trust games we infer trigger strategies that are consistent with equilibria. In finitely repeated games we infer strategies with end-game effects. Almost all strategies inferred are best responses to the inferred strategies of opponents. For the first time we hypothesize repeated game strategies based on observed behavior, and characterize observed behavior using the core game theory concept of repeated-game strategies.

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File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/Economics/papers/2001/w13/autfinal4.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2001-W13.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0113

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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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Related research
Keywords: Game Theory Empirical Methods Experimental Economics Repeated Games Trust

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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  1. B. Arruñada & M. Casari, 2007. "How enforcement institutions affect markets ," Working Papers 616, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Masaki Aoyagi & Guillaume R. Frechette, 2004. "Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000127, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. ENGLE-WARNICK, Jim & McCAUSLAND, William J. & MILLER, John H., 2004. "The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior," Cahiers de recherche 2004-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ido Erev & Alvin Roth & Robert Slonim & Greg Barron, 2007. "Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 29-51, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jim Engle-Warnick, 2007. "Five Indefinitely Repeated Games in the Laboratory," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-11, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eline van der Heijden & Jan Potters & Martin Sefton, 2006. "Hierarchy and Opportunism in Teams," Discussion Papers 2006-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
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  7. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frechette, . "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2007-7, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Pedro Dal Bó, 2005. "Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1591-1604, December. [Downloadable!]
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  10. M. Utku Unver, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 38, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
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