Inferring Repeated Game Strategies From Actions: Evidence From Trust Game Experiments
AbstractThis paper is an empirical study, using new experimental data, of repeated game strategies in trust games; its goal is to identify strategies that people use in repeated games. We develop a strategy inference method that maps observed actions to a set of best fitting unobserved repeated game strategies. Data analysis shows the ability of the method to infer distinct but intuitive and theoretically justified sets of strategies across finitely and indefinitely repeated games. In indefinitely repeated trust games we infer trigger strategies that are consistent with equilibria. In finitely repeated games we infer strategies with end-game effects. Almost all strategies inferred are best responses to the inferred strategies of opponents. For the first time we hypothesize repeated game strategies based on observed behavior, and characterize observed behavior using the core game theory concept of repeated-game strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2001-W13.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jul 2001
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
Game Theory; Empirical Methods; Experimental Economics; Repeated Games; Trust;
Other versions of this item:
- Jim Engle-Warnick & Robert Slonim, 2006. "Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 603-632, 08.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C80 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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