The Consistency of Fairness Rules: An Experimental Study
AbstractIn the last two decades, experimental papers on distributive justice have abounded. Two main results have been replicated Firstly, there is a multiplicity of fairness rules. Secondly, fairness decisions differ depending on the context. This paper studies individual consistency in the use of fairness rules, as well as the structural factors that lead people to be inconsistent. We use a within-subject design, which allows us to compare individual behavior when the context changes. In line with the literature, we find a multiplicity of fairness rules. However, when we control for consistency, the set of fairness rules is considerably smaller. Only selfishness and strict egalitarianism seem to survive the stricter requirement of consistency. We observe that this result is mainly explained by a self-serving bias. Participants select the rule that is individually optimal in each situation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Valencia, ERI-CES in its series Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour with number 1010.
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Justice; Fairness; Laboratory Experiments; Self-serving bias; Consistency;
Other versions of this item:
- Paloma Ubeda, 2010. "The Consistency of Fairness Rules: An Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 2010005, University of Oxford, Nuffield College.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-07-24 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-07-24 (Experimental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James Konow, 2001.
"A Positive Theory of Economic Fairness,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
563824000000000138, David K. Levine.
- Miller, Luis & Ubeda, Paloma, 2012.
"Are women more sensitive to the decision-making context?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 98-104.
- Luis Miller & Paloma Ubeda, 2010. "Are Women More Sensitive to the Decision-Making Context?," Discussion Papers 2010004, University of Oxford, Nuffield College.
- Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Luis Moreno-Garrido, 2012.
"Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(4), pages 138-149, October.
- Luis José Blas Moreno Garrido & Ismael Rodríguez Lara, 2012. "Modeling Inequity Aversion in a Dictator Game with Production," Working Papers. Serie AD 2012-04, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Pedro Rey-Biel & Roman Sheremeta & Neslihan Uler, 2011.
"(Bad) Luck or (Lack of) Effort?: Comparing Social Sharing Norms between US and Europe,"
584, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Pedro Rey-Biel & Roman M. Sheremeta & Neslihan Uler, 2011. "(Bad) Luck or (Lack of) Effort?: Comparing Social Sharing Norms between US and Europe," Working Papers 11-11, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Emilio Calvo Ramón).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.