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Fast or Fair? A Study of Response Times

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  • Marco Piovesan

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Erik Wengström

    (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

This paper uses a modified dictator game to investigate the relationship between response times and social preferences. We find that egoistic subjects make faster decisions than subjects with social preferences. Moreover, our within-analysis reveals that, for a given individual, egoistic payoff maximizing decisions are reached quicker than choices expressing social preferences.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2008/0809.pdf/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 08-09.

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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0809

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Keywords: response times; social preferences;

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References

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  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2006. "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: A Study of Response Times," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2006.36, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Pablo Branas-Garza & Ana Leon-Mejia & Luis M. Miller, 2007. "Response Time under Monetary Incentives: the Ultimatum Game," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2007-070, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
  4. Loewenstein, George & O'Donoghue, Ted, 2004. "Animal Spirits: Affective and Deliberative Processes in Economic Behavior," Working Papers, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics 04-14, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  5. Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti, 2010. "Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2261-78, December.
  6. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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