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Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?

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Author Info
Oechssler, Jörg () (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg)
Roider, Andreas () (Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg)
Schmitz, Patrick W. () (Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Universität Köln)

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Abstract

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 08-06.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 16 Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:08-06

Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Drazen Prelec, 1998. "The Probability Weighting Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 497-528, May.
  2. Colin Camerer & George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, 2005. "Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 43(1), pages 9-64, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2112, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Stahl, Dale O. & Haruvy, Ernan, 2008. "Subgame perfection in ultimatum bargaining trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 292-307, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Instinctive and Cognitive Reasoning: Response Times Study," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000001011, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Peter Cramton & Morley Gunderson & Joseph Tracy, 1999. "The Effect Of Collective Bargaining Legislation On Strikes And Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(3), pages 475-487, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Shane Frederick, 2005. "Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 25-42, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Joerg Oechssler & Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2008. "Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases," Working Papers 0465, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised May 2008. [Downloadable!]
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