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Patrick W. Schmitz

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This is information that was supplied by Patrick Schmitz in registering through RePEc. If you are Patrick W. Schmitz , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Patrick
Middle Name: W.
Last Name: Schmitz
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: psc133

Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage: http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz
Postal Address: University of Cologne, Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany
Phone:

Affiliation

Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Universität zu Köln
Location: Köln, Germany
Homepage: http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de/
Email:
Phone: 0221 / 470 5607
Fax: 0221 / 470 5179
Postal: Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923 Köln
Handle: RePEc:edi:wskoede (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2013. "Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers 9510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 53712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 45243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," MPRA Paper 44953, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," MPRA Paper 44240, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," CEPR Discussion Papers 9065, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 9050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2012. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," CEPR Discussion Papers 9141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," MPRA Paper 36914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality," MPRA Paper 28823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2011. "Investments as Signals of Outside Options," CEPR Discussion Papers 8366, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2011. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," MPRA Paper 32716, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2011. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 8241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2010. "Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7976, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Hoppe, Eva I & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," CEPR Discussion Papers 7681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Hoppe, Eva I & Kusterer, David J & Schmitz, Patrick W, 2010. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," CEPR Discussion Papers 8167, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick, 2009. "Signaling an Outside Option," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 281, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 7331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 7252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases," IZA Discussion Papers 3481, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  23. Philipp C. Wichardt & Daniel Schunk & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2008. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," IEW - Working Papers 398, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  24. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6807, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  25. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 6988, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Ohlendorf, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6725, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks," CEPR Discussion Papers 7056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6322, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  29. Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 6476, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 6478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  31. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6467, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 6207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 5747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2006. "Garbled Elections," CEPR Discussion Papers 5958, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  35. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  36. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  37. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  38. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse25_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  39. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  40. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  41. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  42. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," CEPR Discussion Papers 4264, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  43. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003)," MPRA Paper 6975, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  44. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  45. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information," MPRA Paper 6934, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  46. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  47. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  48. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  49. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," MPRA Paper 12531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  50. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper 12532, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  51. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  52. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," MPRA Paper 12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  53. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  54. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances," CEPR Discussion Papers 2698, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  55. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 2679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  56. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999)," MPRA Paper 6971, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  57. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung," MPRA Paper 6945, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  58. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)," MPRA Paper 6972, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  59. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  60. Anke Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick Schmitz, 2000. "Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse19_2000, University of Bonn, Germany.
  61. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper 12534, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  62. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  63. Schmitz, Patrick & Dirk Sliwka, 1999. "On Synergies and Vertical Integration," Discussion Paper Serie A 602, University of Bonn, Germany.
  64. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," MPRA Paper 12533, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  65. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "On Randomization in Coalition Contracts," MPRA Paper 13446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  66. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma," MPRA Paper 6936, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  67. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," MPRA Paper 13448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  68. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  69. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6943, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  70. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  71. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?," MPRA Paper 6937, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  72. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem," MPRA Paper 6944, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  73. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1996. "Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge," MPRA Paper 6947, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2014. "Investments as signals of outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 683-708.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 108-117.
  3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 28-31.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
  5. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
  6. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 336-339.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 533-536.
  9. Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(1), pages 56-74, 03.
  10. Susanne Ohlendorf & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory: The Case Of Risk‐Neutrality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(2), pages 433-452, 05.
  11. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
  12. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 642-645.
  13. Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2012. "Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 808-830, 09.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 841-843.
  15. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 651-665.
  16. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2011. "Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 186-199, September.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
  18. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 58-62, April.
  19. Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Public versus private ownership: Quantity contracts and the allocation of investment tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(3-4), pages 258-268, April.
  20. Wichardt, Philipp C. & Schunk, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 33-35, April.
  21. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 147-152, October.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 577-580, June.
  23. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 268-271, December.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  25. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Patrick Schmitz, 2008. "Task scheduling and moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 307-320, November.
  26. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 208-214, December.
  27. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2007. "Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 859-870, May.
  28. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 637-653, 04.
  29. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2007. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 74(296), pages 573-585, November.
  30. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
  31. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Endogenous Punishments In Agency With Verifiable Ex Post Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1207-1231, November.
  32. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(6), pages 727-738, December.
  33. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
  34. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
  35. P. W. Schmitz, 2004. "Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 87-92, 01.
  36. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 56(1), pages 72-89, January.
  37. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  38. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "On second-price auctions and imperfect competition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 901-909, November.
  39. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2003. "Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 153-173, April.
  40. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September.
  41. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
  42. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  43. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  44. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 2001. "On synergies and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1281-1295, September.
  45. Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
  46. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. ""Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 115-125, September.
  47. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
  48. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
  49. R. Luce & M. Raith & E. Rasmusen & S. Grosskopf & K. Velupillai & W. Pauwels & E. Furubotn & P. Schmitz & S. Napel, 2000. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 316-342, October.
  50. Schmitz, P. W., 2000. "Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382]," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 575-575, December.
  51. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1999. "Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 181-185, May.
  52. Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 1027, September.
  53. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1998. " Randomization in Coalition Contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 341-53, March.
  54. Patrick W. Schmitz & Dirk Sliwka, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 15, pages 233-243.
  55. Schmitz, Patrick W, 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 52(1), pages 89-101.

NEP Fields

56 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2007-09-24 2011-02-26 2012-07-23
  2. NEP-CBE: Cognitive & Behavioural Economics (5) 2008-05-31 2008-05-31 2009-01-03 2011-04-02 2013-02-16. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2006-12-09 2007-05-12 2011-08-15
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2006-01-29 2007-03-31
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (26) 2008-04-12 2009-02-28 2009-02-28 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2009-11-07 2009-12-19 2011-02-12 2011-02-26 2011-04-02 2012-03-08 2012-07-23 2012-07-29 2012-07-29 2012-10-06 2012-10-13 2012-10-27 2013-01-12 2013-02-16 2013-03-16 2013-03-23 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2013-09-24 2014-06-02. Author is listed
  6. NEP-ENV: Environmental Economics (1) 2005-10-29
  7. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (2) 2008-05-31 2008-06-07
  8. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (14) 2007-09-30 2008-04-29 2008-05-31 2008-05-31 2008-11-25 2009-01-03 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2011-02-12 2011-04-02 2012-07-29 2013-02-16 2013-04-13 2013-09-24. Author is listed
  9. NEP-FIN: Finance (1) 2001-02-27
  10. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (2) 2005-08-13 2006-01-29
  11. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2007-09-30 2008-04-12 2008-05-31 2009-03-14 2009-04-25 2011-08-15 2013-03-16 2013-04-13 2013-09-24. Author is listed
  12. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-02-16
  13. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (3) 2012-03-08 2012-07-29 2013-03-23
  14. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2003-02-20 2014-06-02
  15. NEP-INO: Innovation (4) 2007-03-31 2012-07-23 2012-10-27 2013-01-12
  16. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2012-07-23
  17. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (1) 2013-01-12
  18. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2005-12-14
  19. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (4) 2005-05-07 2005-12-09 2005-12-14 2005-12-14
  20. NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (1) 2005-05-07
  21. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (19) 2004-02-29 2004-02-29 2005-05-07 2005-10-29 2005-10-29 2005-12-14 2006-10-28 2006-12-09 2007-03-31 2007-09-30 2011-04-02 2011-08-15 2012-07-29 2013-01-12 2013-03-16 2013-03-23 2013-04-13 2013-04-13 2014-06-02. Author is listed
  22. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (8) 2004-02-29 2005-10-29 2006-05-20 2006-12-09 2009-02-28 2011-02-12 2012-07-29 2012-10-06. Author is listed
  23. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (3) 2006-12-09 2007-05-12 2011-08-15
  24. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (3) 2008-04-12 2011-02-12 2011-02-26
  25. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (4) 2003-02-18 2006-05-20 2012-10-06 2012-10-27
  26. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2005-05-07 2005-12-14 2005-12-14
  27. NEP-RES: Resource Economics (1) 2006-05-20
  28. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (2) 2005-12-14 2007-09-30

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. h-index
  11. Number of Journal Pages
  12. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  13. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  14. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  16. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  17. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  18. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  19. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  20. Wu-Index
  21. Strength of students

Most cited item

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

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