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Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?

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Author Info
Schmitz, Patrick W.

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Abstract

This article considers a bilateral externality problem, in which injurers and victims choose activity levels and levels of care. The incentive effects of liability rules and fines for harm done are analyzed. It is shown that in general socially optimal behaviour can only be induced if fines are imposed. However, if collusion between the injurer and the victim is possible, we cannot achieve more with the help of fines than with liability rules alone.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6937/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6937.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Publication status: Published in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 3.48(1997): pp. 351-360
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6937

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K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law

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  1. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-18.

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