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Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management

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  • Bogetoft, Peter
  • Nielsen, Kurt

Abstract

This paper discuss the design of multidimensional yardstick based procurement auction. The suggested design combines Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) based yardstick schemes with the multidimensional score auction. The principal select a single winner to perform a project, characterized by a multidimensional vector. The design is especially useful when there are uncertainty about the underlying common cost structure as well as the principal's valuation function. Potential applications in natural resource management is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:iaae03:25910
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25910
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Resource /Energy Economics and Policy;

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