The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights
AbstractUsing a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs it is demonstrated that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
Property rights; bargaining; private information; Coase theorem;
Other versions of this item:
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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