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A simple framework for investigating the properties of policy games

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  • Piacquadio Paolo G.
  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni
  • Acocella Nicola

Abstract

The paper extensively studies the static model of non-cooperative linear quadratic games in which a set of agents chooses their instruments strategically to minimize their linear quadratic criterion. We first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium as well as for multiple equilibria to arise. Furthermore, we study the general condition for policy neutrality and Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium by introducing a new concept of decisiveness.

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File URL: http://wp.comunite.it/data/wp_no_59_2009.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 0059.

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Date of creation: Dec 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0059

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Web page: http://wp.comunite.it/

Related research

Keywords: Conflict of interest; Nash equilibrium existence; multiplicity; policy invariance; controllability; Pareto efficiency;

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  2. Gibbard, Allan, 1974. "A Pareto-consistent libertarian claim," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 388-410, April.
  3. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-45, August.
  4. Nabil Al-Najjar, Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2003. "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics gueconwpa~03-03-28, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
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  7. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80.
  10. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-57, Jan.-Feb..
  11. Bernholz, Peter, 1999. "The generalized Coase Theorem and separable individual preferences: an extension," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 331-335, June.
  12. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Bernholz, Peter, 1997. "Property rights, contracts, cyclical social preferences and the Coase theorem: A synthesis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 419-442, September.
  14. Wulf Gaerther & Prasanta K. Pattanaik & Kotaro Suzumura, 1991. "Individual Rights Revisited," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University a238, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  15. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
  16. Usher, Dan, 1998. "The Coase theorem is tautological, incoherent or wrong," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-11, October.
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