This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli () (Department of Economics, Georgetown University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which the presence of ex-ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify and investigate the basic `hold-up problem' which arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay some ex-ante costs for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a `Coasian solution' to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a Coasian solution to the hold-up problem typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence with a new hold-up problem

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/Robustness.htm
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: None

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Georgetown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number gueconwpa~03-03-27.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~03-03-27

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036
Phone: 202-687-6074
Fax: 202-687-6102
Email:
Web page: http://econ.georgetown.edu/

Order Information:
Postal: Marcia Suss Administrative Officer Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036
Email:
Web: http://econ.georgetown.edu/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Marcia Suss).

Related research
Keywords: Transaction Costs; Hold-Up Problem; Coase Theorem; Coasian Negotiation.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 362, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    Other versions:
  3. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  6. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-82, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Jong-Il Kim & Lawrence J. Lau, 1996. "The sources of Asian Pacific economic growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 448-54, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1993. "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 303-23, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Costly Contingent Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 313, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  10. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Randall Akee, 2006. "Checkerboards and Coase: Transactions Costs and Efficiency in Land Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 2438, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Zaman, Md Monowaruz, 2007. "The theoretical aspect of Muhammad Yunus’s dream-'putting poverty in museums'," MPRA Paper 1306, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mishra, Ashok & Harris, J. Michael & Erickson, Kenneth & Hallahan, Charles, 2008. "What Drives Agricultural Profitability in the U.S.: Application of the DuPont Expansion Model," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6413, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  4. Zaman, Md Monowaruz, 2008. "An introduction to Economics of Information Biasing (EIB)," MPRA Paper 635, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alex Anas & Richard Arnott, 2004. "Moving costs, security of tenure and eviction," Urban/Regional 0408005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.