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Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Benoit, Jean-Pierre
Krishna, Vijay
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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number
91-34.
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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1991Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:91-34Contact details of provider: Postal: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012 Phone: (212) 998-8936 Fax: (212) 995-3932 Web page: http://econ.as.nyu.edu/object/econ.cvstarr.html More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Economic equilibrium ; References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989.
"Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David G. Pearce, 1987.
"Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation ,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
855, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
[Downloadable!]
Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987.
"Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987.
"Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989.
"Renegotiation in repeated games ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985.
"Finitely Repeated Games ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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