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Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Felli, L.
Roberts, K.
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In an environment in which both buyers and sellers can undertake match specific investments, the presence of market competition for matches may solve hold-up and coordination problems generated by the absence of complete contingent contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when marching is assortative and sellers' investment precede market competition the investments are constrained efficient.
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number
2000-w11.
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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:2000-w11Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Maxine Collett).
Keywords: COMPETITION ; MARKET STRUCTURE ; Other versions of this item:
Paper Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2001.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
414, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, .
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
CARESS Working Papres
00-04, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, .
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
4a7d448e61f494c5472087aed, Penn Economics Department.
[Downloadable!] Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts, 2000.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1714, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!] Felli, Leonhardo & Roberts, Kevin, 2000.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem? ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Felli, Leonardo & Roberts, Kevin W S, 2002.
"Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3535, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Find related papers by JEL classification: D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
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Other versions: Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1992.
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Other versions: Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997.
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STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series
364, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
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Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999.
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Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2000.
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Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2001.
"Competing Premarital Investment ,"
Working Papers
peters-01-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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"Competing Premarital Investments ,"
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Bolton, Patrick & Whinston, Michael D, 1993.
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Edlin, Aaron S. & Shannon, Chris, 1998.
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Other versions: Eeckhout, Jan, 1999.
"Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity ,"
International Economic Review ,
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"Appropriation and Efficiency: A Revision of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 808-27, September.
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Kalyan Chatterjee & Y. Chiu, 2007.
"When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments? ,"
Topics in Theoretical Economics ,
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"Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment ,"
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"Competitive Search Equilibrium ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988.
"Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
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Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997.
"Marriage and Class ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
Diamond, Peter A., 1971.
"A model of price adjustment ,"
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Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation ,"
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"Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities ,"
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"Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts ,"
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"Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market ,"
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Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 1996.
"Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999.
"Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions ,"
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