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Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matthew O. Jackson (California Institute of Technology)
Simon Wilkie (California Institute of Technology)
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We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
0211008.
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Date of creation: 04 Nov 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211008Note: Type of Document - pdfContact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: game theory ; mechanism design ; contracts ; side payments ; endogenous games ; public goods ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
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