The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights
AbstractUsing a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs it is demonstrated that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6929.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Journal of Law and Economics 1.11(2001): pp. 23-28
Other versions of this item:
- Patrick Schmitz, 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 23-28, January.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
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