The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: games in transition function form
AbstractWe propose a new type of cooperative game - a game in transition function (TF) form Ã¢â¬â as a means of representing social decision making procedures that is suitable for the analysis of rights. The TF form is a generalisation of the effectivity function (EF) form, and in particular it tells us (where the EF form does not) about the alienability of a right. We describe procedures for generating a (unique) EF game from a TF game, and for generating a (non-unique) TF game from an EF game. We make some specific proposals about the representation of rights as properties of TF games and comment on some implications about the relationship between rights and Pareto efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 37 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2011. "The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 11-09, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Ben McQuillin & Robert Sugden, 2009. "The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 09-15, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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