AbstractThe major purpose of the paper is a comparison of social-choice formulations of liberty with game-form formulations. The set of admissible strategies of different people cannot be considered independently of each other, and a person's "private sphere" has to be defined by identifying permissible combinations of strategies. This move requires invoking social-choice considerations as part of the formulation of game-form rights. Second, the game-form approach concentrates exclusively on the choice aspect of preference. In contrast, the versatility of social choice formulations permits discussion of a much broader range of issues of liberty. It is also demonstrated, inter alia, why contracting cannot eliminate the dilemma of the Paretian liberal, as long as people are free to have or not have such a contract. Copyright 1992 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 59 (1992)
Issue (Month): 234 (May)
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