Waiver, Effectivity and Rights as Game Forms
AbstractThis paper introduces the concept of a waiver function of a game form: a function that measures the extent to which one can leave choice to others. This is compared with the concept of effectively function used to measure the power of coalitions within a game form. The author shows that under some circumstances either function can be used to capture the notion of rights underlying game forms. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 61 (1994)
Issue (Month): 242 (May)
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