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Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games

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  • Guzzini Enrico
  • Palestrini Antonio

Abstract

In this paper, we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the robustness of the Coase theorem with respect to the ?nal distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated ?eld of research. In our framework, in order to reach e¢ ciency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts. In the analysis, we distinguish between permanent and temporary contracts showing the di¤erent implication of the two kinds of contracts with respect to the ?nal attribution of individual rights. More precisely, we show that, with temporary binding contracts and under particular assumptions, the ?nal attribution if individual rights does not converge.

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Paper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 0060.

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Date of creation: Dec 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0060

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Keywords: Coase theorem; binding contracts; side payments;

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  19. Sen, Amartya Kumar, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Scholarly Articles 3612779, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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