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On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Schmitz, Patrick W.
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The efficiency of two different means of controlling hazardous economic activities, namely ex post liability for harm done and ex ante safety regulation, is re-examined. Some researchers have stressed that the complementary use of these two instruments can be socially advantageous. Here it is argued that the models which have been built in order to support this view crucially depend on the assumption that there are persistent enforcement errors. It is demonstrated that such a rather unsatisfactory assumption is not needed if wealth varies among injurers.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
12536.
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Date of creation: 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:12536Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219 Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900 Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
Keywords: Liability ; Safety Regulation ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Public Choice ,
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Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1996.
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NBER Working Papers
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Other versions: Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1991.
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American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 54-58, May.
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A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1991.
"A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals ,"
NBER Working Papers
3232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions: Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001.
"The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory ,"
MPRA Paper
12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Other versions: Steven Shavell, 1984.
"A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990.
"Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W., 1998.
"Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment ,"
MPRA Paper
13448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004.
"When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution? ,"
Working Papers
04-27, Utrecht School of Economics.
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Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002.
"Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare ,"
CIRANO Working Papers
2002s-13, CIRANO.
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Other versions: Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001.
"A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory ,"
Discussion Papers
dp-01-13, Resources For the Future.
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Stefan Felder & Anja Olbrich, 2009.
"Dealing with Excessive Off-label Drug Use: Liability vs. Patent Prolongation ,"
Ruhr Economic Papers
0114, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
[Downloadable!]
Gerrit de Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005.
"Soft Regulators, Though Judges ,"
Working Papers
05-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2003.
"The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis ,"
Working Papers
03-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ingo Vogelsang & Nishal Ramphal & Stephen Carroll & Nicholas Pace, 2007.
"An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries ,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics ,
Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001.
"The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory ,"
MPRA Paper
12562, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Eef Delhaye, 2004.
"Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax ,"
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ete0407, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
[Downloadable!]
Giraud-Heraud, Eric & Grazia, Cristina & Hammoudi, Abdelhakim, 2007.
"Agrifood safety standards, market power and consumer misperceptions ,"
105th Seminar, March 8-10, 2007, Bologna, Italy
7849, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
[Downloadable!]
Anja Olbrich, 2008.
"The optimal negligence standard in health care under supply-side cost sharing ,"
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics ,
Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 73-85, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomsen, Michael R. & Ollinger, Michael & Crandall, Philip G. & O'Bryan, Corliss, 2008.
"Mandatory Food Recalls ,"
2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida
6083, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
[Downloadable!]
Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002.
"Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution ,"
Working papers
2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA), 2008.
"Variable Probabilities of Suit and Liability Rules ,"
Cahiers du GREThA
2008-15, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
[Downloadable!]
Iljoong Kim, 2008.
"Securities laws ‘facilitating’ private enforcement ,"
European Journal of Law and Economics ,
Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 17-38, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Garoupa, Nuno & Obidzinski, Marie, 2006.
"The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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