1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1982. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 0932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
3. Louis Kaplow, 1992. "The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely are Undesirable," NBER Working Papers 3008, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "The optimal probability and magnitude of fines for acts that definitely are undesirable," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 3-11, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Hugh Gravelle & Nuno Garoupa, . "Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defence Expenditure," Discussion Papers 00/08, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hugh Gravelle & Nuno Garoupa, 2002. "Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 40(3), pages 366-379, July.
3. Timothy Stanley, 1995. "Optimal Penalties for Concealment of Crime," Law and Economics 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Dec 1995. [Downloadable!]
4. repec:bep:rlecon:3:2007:2:3 is not listed on IDEAS
5. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economics Working Papers 246, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 278-88, April.
6. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Marette, Stéphan, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Staff General Research Papers 12451, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephan Marette, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp412, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
   • Stephan Marette, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 05-wp412, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
8. Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Too much or not enough crimes? On the ambiguous effects of repression," MPRA Paper 1575, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
9. Boyd, James, 1996. "Banking on "Green Money:" Are Environmental Financial Responsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," Discussion Papers dp-96-26, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
10. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Timothy Stanley, 1995. "Radar Detectors, Fixed and Variable Costs of Crime," Law and Economics 9507002, EconWPA, revised 27 Dec 1995. [Downloadable!]
13. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe," NBER Working Papers 10760, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "Optimal fines and auditing when wealth is costly to observe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 323-335, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Bogetic, Zeljko & Hillman, Arye L., 1994. "The tax base in transition : the case of Bulgaria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1267, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
15. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Arguedas, Carmen, 2007. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2007/13, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
16. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable," NBER Working Papers 10761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 2006. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 823-835, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Optimal environmental standards under asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
18. Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Economics Working Papers 454, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)