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The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Francesco Parisi ()
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci ()
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Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics.
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Paper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
03-13.
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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2003Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0313Contact details of provider: Postal: 12 Janskerkhof, NL-3512 BL Utrecht Phone: +31 30 253 9800 Fax: +31 30 253 7373 Email: Web page: http://www.uu.nl/EN/faculties/leg/organisation/schools/schoolofeconomicsuse/Pages/default.aspx More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: communal liability ; tort ; ancient law ; primitive society ; group liability. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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