Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution
AbstractThe standard economic model of bilateral precaution postulates that the care that is taken by injurers and victims affects only expected accident loss. This paper considers situations in which each party’s precaution also directly affects the other party’s cost of taking precaution. When this additional externality is introduced into a model of unilateral harm, none of the standard tort liability rule induce socially optimal behavior by both parties. Moreover, under a contributory negligence rule, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies; this gives rise to the possibility of litigation in equilibrium. “Tortlike” liability rules that can induce socially optimal care by both parties are characterized. The model is then extended to consider the case of bilateral harm, in which all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal care by both parties, as long as each can sue to recover its full accident losses.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 34 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
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Other versions of this item:
- Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002. "Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution," Working papers 2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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