Sequential torts and bilateral harm
AbstractThis paper analyzes care incentives of individuals in a bilateral-harm setting if care choices are sequential. We find that the efficient outcome is not guaranteed under any liability rule considered, irrespective of whether information is perfect or imperfect. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to generally rank liability rules according to their induced social costs. These findings are in strong contrast to the sequential-torts setting in which harm is unilateral.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle
Care incentives Sequential care Bilateral harm Tort law;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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