This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Steven Shavell

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Liability in tort and the regulation of safety are considered as means of controlling accident risks using the instrumentalist, economic method of analysis.Four general determinants of the relative social desirability of liability and regulation are first identified--differences in knowledge about risky activities as between a social authority and private parties; the possibility that parties would not be able to pay fully for harm done; the chance that they would not face suit for harm done; and administrative costs. On the basis of analysis of these determinants, it is suggested that the choices observed to be made between liability and regulation are, when broadly viewed, socially rational: Notably, activities that create the risk of the typical tort and that are little regulated characteristically display features leading us to say that they ought to be controlled mainly by liability. And activities that are much regulated -- especially ones involving significant hazards to health or to the environment -- ought to be directly constrained in important ways, taking into account their usual features.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w1218.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1218.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 1983
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1218

Note: LE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2004. "When Will Judgment Proof Injurers Take Too Much Precaution?," Working Papers 04-27, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. David Meintrup & Chang Woon Nam, 2006. "Shadow Market Area for Air Pollutants," ERSA conference papers ersa06p412, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," NBER Working Papers 8650, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Eirik Amundsen, 1992. "Optimal failure rates and penalty-bonus policies in the offshore petroleum sector," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(5), pages 469-489, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dhammika Dharmapala & Sandra A. Hoffmann, 2002. "Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution," Working papers 2002-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ephraim Clark & Gérard Mondello, 2000. "Resource Management and the Mayor's Guarantee in French Water Allocation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 15(2), pages 103-113, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gerrit de Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2005. "Soft Regulators, Though Judges," Working Papers 05-06, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hiriart, Yolande & Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2005. "The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors," CEPR Discussion Papers 4992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Eef Delhaye, 2004. "Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0407, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  10. Garoupa, Nuno & Obidzinski, Marie, 2006. "The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5899, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002. "Modeling the Choice Between Regulation and Liability in Terms of Social Welfare," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-13, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Hoffmann, Sandra & Schwartz, Warren & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2001. "A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory," Discussion Papers dp-01-13, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  13. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law," NBER Working Papers 9699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Ephraim Clark & Gérard Mondello, 2000. "Water Management in France: Delegation and Irreversibility," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 325-352, November. [Downloadable!]
  15. Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Carel Vachon, 1999. "Dealing with Major Technological Risks," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-29, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  17. Steven Shavell, 1983. "A Model of the Socially Optimal Use of Liability and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 1220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002. "The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-17, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.