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The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?

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Author Info
Marcel Boyer ()
Donatella Porrini

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Abstract

We address in this paper the problem of comparing and choosing among different policy instruments to implement the incentive objective of an efficient deterrence of environmental degradation and the remedy objective of an efficient clean-up of damages and a proper compensation of victims. Two main instruments are considered, namely the assignment of legal liability for environmental damage, such as in the American CERCLA and in the European White Paper, including extended liability provisions, and the design of an incentive regulation framework. Our results derive from a formal and structured analytical approach to modeling the economic interactions between different decision makers such as governments, firms, regulators and financiers.

Dans cet article, nous comparons différents instruments visant une protection efficace contre la dégradation de l'environnement, une couverture efficace des dommages et une compensation convenable aux victimes. Nous considérons deux instruments principaux, à savoir un régime de réglementation incitative et un régime de responsabilité légale en cas de dommages environnementaux, tel qu'on le trouve dans le CERCLA américain et le White Paper européen qui comportent des provisions de responsabilité élargie. Nous développons une approche analytique structurée et formelle à la modélisation des interactions économiques entre les différents décideurs que sont les gouvernements, les entreprises, les régulateurs et les financiers.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2002s-17.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-17

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Related research
Keywords: Environmental policy extended liability regulatory capture instrument choice Politique environnementale responsabilité élargie capture des régulateurs choix d'instruments

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rohan Pitchford, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 739-745, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2001. "The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat. System"," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-60, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  3. Steven Shavell, 1983. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety," NBER Working Papers 1218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2008. "The Efficient Liability Sharing Factor For Environmental Disasters: Lessons For Optimal Insurance Regulation," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-03, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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