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The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat. System"

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Author Info
Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin ()
Erwann Michel-Kerjan

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Abstract

Twenty years ago, the French created a so far unique insurance scheme to cover damages due to natural catastrophes. This so-called ''Cat-Nat system'' combines private insurance industry, a state-guaranteed public reinsurance and the Treasury. We provide a simple game-theoretic model which seems to capture the situation of the concrete scheme. We find that, depending on its expectations, the government modulates its policy to induce private insurers adopting one of those two opposite strategies: (i) transfer all the covered risks to the public reinsurer and therefore simply behave as indemnification intermediaries; (ii) conserve the largest share of high risks.

Il y a 20 ans, la France créait un système d assurance des sinistres dus aux catastrophes naturelles qui demeure unique au monde. Le système Cat.Nat est constitué d un partenariat entre l industrie privée de l assurance, un réassureur public et le Ministère des Finances. Nous proposons ici un modèle simple de ce système qui semble refléter concrètement son fonctionnement. Nous montrons que le gouvernement, suivant ses attentes, choisit de moduler sa politique de prise en charge de tels risques afin de conduire les assureurs privés à adopter l une des deux stratégies diamétralement opposées: (i) transférer tous les risques au réassureur public et ainsi se comporter comme de simples intermédiaires financiers; (ii) décider de conserver le plus possible de hauts risques.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2001s-60.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-60

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Related research
Keywords: catastrophe risk-sharing; French insurance system; public-private sector partnership; signaling equilibria; partage de risques catastrophiques; système français d'assurance; partenariat public/privé; équilibres de signal;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Browne, Mark J & Hoyt, Robert E, 2000. " The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 291-306, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

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