Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat. System"

Contents:

Author Info

  • Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin

    ()

  • Erwann Michel-Kerjan

Abstract

Twenty years ago, the French created a so far unique insurance scheme to cover damages due to natural catastrophes. This so-called ''Cat-Nat system'' combines private insurance industry, a state-guaranteed public reinsurance and the Treasury. We provide a simple game-theoretic model which seems to capture the situation of the concrete scheme. We find that, depending on its expectations, the government modulates its policy to induce private insurers adopting one of those two opposite strategies: (i) transfer all the covered risks to the public reinsurer and therefore simply behave as indemnification intermediaries; (ii) conserve the largest share of high risks. Il y a 20 ans, la France créait un système d assurance des sinistres dus aux catastrophes naturelles qui demeure unique au monde. Le système Cat.Nat est constitué d un partenariat entre l industrie privée de l assurance, un réassureur public et le Ministère des Finances. Nous proposons ici un modèle simple de ce système qui semble refléter concrètement son fonctionnement. Nous montrons que le gouvernement, suivant ses attentes, choisit de moduler sa politique de prise en charge de tels risques afin de conduire les assureurs privés à adopter l une des deux stratégies diamétralement opposées: (i) transférer tous les risques au réassureur public et ainsi se comporter comme de simples intermédiaires financiers; (ii) décider de conserver le plus possible de hauts risques.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2001s-60.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2001s-60.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-60

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2020 rue University, 25e étage, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2A5
Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Email:
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: catastrophe risk-sharing; French insurance system; public-private sector partnership; signaling equilibria; partage de risques catastrophiques; système français d'assurance; partenariat public/privé; équilibres de signal;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  2. Browne, Mark J & Hoyt, Robert E, 2000. " The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 291-306, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Serge Garcia & Alban Thomas, 2002. "An Empirical Analysis of Water Supply Contracts," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-01, CIRANO.
  2. Ngo Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2005. "Selective penalization of polluters: an inf-convolution approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 421-454, 02.
  3. Michel Moreaux & Michel Truchon, 2002. "Maximal Decompositions of Cost Games into Specific and Joint Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-42, CIRANO.
  4. Marcel Dagenais & Claude Montmarquette & Nathalie Viennot-Briot, 2001. "Dropout, School Performance and Working while in School : An Econometric Model with Heterogeneous Groups," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-63, CIRANO.
  5. Luigi Buzzacchi & Gilberto Turati, 2009. "Collective Risks in Local Administrations: Can a Private Insurer Be Better than a Public Mutual Fund?," Working papers 3, Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino.
  6. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2002. "The Choice of Instruments for Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-17, CIRANO.
  7. John Galbraith & Serguei Zernov & Victoria Zinde-Walsh, 2001. "Conditional Quantiles of Volatility in Equity Index and Foreign Exchange Data," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-61, CIRANO.
  8. Van Long, Ngo & Shimomura, Koji, 2004. "Relative wealth, status-seeking, and catching-up," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 529-542, April.
  9. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001. "Incentives in Common Agency," Cahiers de recherche 01-08, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  10. Julie Doonan & Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, 2002. "Environmental Performance of Canadian Pulp and Paper Plants: Why Some Do Well and Others Do Not ?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-24, CIRANO.
  11. Nathalie De Marcelis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2003. "Catastrophe risk sharing and public-private partnerships : From natural disasters to terrorism," Working Papers hal-00242981, HAL.
  12. Yoshua Bengio & Charles Dugas, 2002. "Forecasting Non-Stationary Volatility with Hyper-Parameters," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-50, CIRANO.
  13. John Galbraith & Turgut Kisinbay, 2002. "Information Content of Volatility Forecasts at Medium-term Horizons," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-21, CIRANO.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2001s-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.