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Dealing with Major Technological Risks

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  • Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
  • Carel Vachon

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  • Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Carel Vachon, 1999. "Dealing with Major Technological Risks," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-29, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:99s-29
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/99s-29.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1996. "Environmental protection, producer insolvency and lender liability," Chapters, in: Anastasios Xepapadeas (ed.), Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources, chapter 1, pages 1-29, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Kunreuther, Howard & Hogarth, Robin & Meszaros, Jacqueline, 1993. "Insurer Ambiguity and Maarket Failure," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 71-87, August.
    3. Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, 1998. "Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(2), pages 155-170, April.
    4. Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1983. "Variations in the Probability and Magnitude of Loss: Their Impact on Risk," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(3), pages 411-419, August.
    5. Steven Shavell, 1983. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety," NBER Working Papers 1218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Lanoie, Paul & Laplante, Benoit & Roy, Maite, 1998. "Can capital markets create incentives for pollution control?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 31-41, July.
    7. Itoh, Hideshi, 1994. "Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 691-700, April.
    8. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    9. Gollier, Christian & Jullien, Bruno & Treich, Nicolas, 2000. "Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the 'Precautionary Principle'," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 229-253, February.
    10. Pitchford, Rohan, 1995. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1171-1186, December.
    11. Boyd, James & Ingberman, Daniel E, 1997. "The Search for Deep Pockets: Is "Extended Liability" Expensive Liability?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 232-258, April.
    12. Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1993. "Global Environmental Risks," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 65-86, Fall.
    13. Manning, Richard L, 1994. "Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 247-275, April.
    14. Anastasios Xepapadeas (ed.), 1996. "Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1012.
    15. Landefeld, J.S. & Seskin, E.P., 1982. "The economic value of life: linking theory to practice," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 72(6), pages 555-566.
    16. Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard, 1999. "How to Restore Higher-Powered Incentives in Multitask Agencies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 418-433, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Grégoire Bernard & Benoit Aubert & Simon Bourdeau & Éric Clément & Caroline Debuissy & Marie-Josée Dumoulin & Marc Laberge & Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Ingrid Peignier, 2002. "Le risque : un modèle conceptuel d'intégration," CIRANO Project Reports 2002rp-16, CIRANO.
    2. António Brandão Moniz, 2012. "Avaliação participativa de tecnologia e sustentabilidade organizacional [Participative technology assessment and organisational sustainability]," IET Working Papers Series 06/2012, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, IET/CICS.NOVA-Interdisciplinary Centre on Social Sciences, Faculty of Science and Technology.
    3. Picard, Pierre & Chemarin, Sophie, 2004. "Appréhension et prévention des risques industriels," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0502, CEPREMAP.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Safety; major risks; risk assessment; risk sharing; risk control; prevention; mitigation; Sécurité; risques majeurs; évaluation des risques; distribution des risques; contrôle des risques; prévention; atténuation;
    All these keywords.

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    1. Technology Assessment

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