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Régulation des risques et insolvabilité: le rôle de la responsabilité pour faute en information imparfaite

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Author Info
Claude Fluet () (Economics Department, UQAM)

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Abstract

Avec la règle de la responsabilité sans faute, un agent potentiellement insolvable est incité à prendre insuffisammant de précautions dans la pratique d'activités imposant des risques à des tiers. La règle plus courante de la responsabilité pour faute peut pallier ce problème puisqu'elle conditionne la responsabilité légale sur le comportement de prévention de l'agent, observé ex post. Cet article généralise l'analyse de la responsabilité pour faute au cas où la cour n'obtient qu'une information imparfaite sur le comportement de l'agent. En particulier, je montre que le critère juridique de la prépondérance de preuve est compatible avec l'efficacité incitative.

Under the tort law strict liability rule, a potentially judgment proof agent will take suboptimal care in the conduct of risk generating activities, thereby imposing excessive risks on third parties. The more common negligence rule can alleviate this problem by conditioning liability on the agent's actual level of care, observed ex post. This paper extends the analysis of the negligence rule to the case where courts can obtain only imperfect information on the level of care. In particular, I show that the legal practice concerning standards of proof is compatible with incentive efficiency.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 9802.

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Length: 26
Date of creation: Nov 1998
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Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9802

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Related research
Keywords: negligence rule strict liability rule moral hazard

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1995. "Environmental Protection, Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-50, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. P. A. Diamond, 1973. "Single Activity Accidents," Working papers 113, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert & Gagnon, Francois & Vanasse, Charles, 1997. "Debt, moral hazard and airline safety An empirical evidence," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 379-402, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 127(4), pages 622-, December.
    Other versions:
  5. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1357-67, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Brander, James A & Spencer, Barbara J, 1989. "Moral Hazard and Limited Liability: Implications for the Theory of the Firm," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 833-49, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Park, Eun-Soo, 1995. "Incentive Contracting under Limited Liability," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(3), pages 477-90, Fall.
  10. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Kolstad, Charles D & Ulen, Thomas S & Johnson, Gary V, 1990. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 888-901, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Claude Fluet, 2006. "Liability Rules under Evidentiary Uncertainty," Cahiers de recherche 0606, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  2. Claude Fluet, 2002. "Enforcing Contracts: Should Courts Seek the Truth?," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-76, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Claude Fluet, 2002. "Assurance de responsabilité et aléa moral dans les régimes de responsabilité objective et pour faute," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 149, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
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