Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 8 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
lender liability; limited liability effect; monitoring; vague negligence rule;
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- Pitchford, Rohan, 1995. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1171-86, December.
- Balkenborg, D., 1997. "Bargaining power and the impact of lender liability for environmental damages," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9709, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Boyd, James & Ingberman, Daniel E, 1997. "The Search for Deep Pockets: Is "Extended Liability" Expensive Liability?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 232-58, April.
- Heyes, Anthony G, 1996. "Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 311-23, May.
- Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 203-213, June.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1997. "Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 47, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
- Schwartz, Alan., 1984. "Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship," Working Papers 542, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998.
"Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(4), pages 622-, December.
- Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1996. "Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem," Cahiers de recherche du DÃ©partement des sciences Ã©conomiques, UQAM 9602, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Newman, Harry A. & Wright, David W., 1990. "Strict liability in a principal-agent model," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 219-231, December.
- Posey, Lisa Lipowski, 1993. "Limited liability and incentives when firms can inflict damages greater than net worth," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 325-330, September.
- Wiggins, Steven N & Ringleb, Al H, 1992. "Adverse Selection and Long-Term Hazards: The Choice between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 189-215, January.
- Helm, Carsten, 2008.
"How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 263-271, December.
- Helm, Carsten, 2005. "How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 36799, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- Hutchinson, Emma & van 't Veld, Klaas, 2005. "Extended liability for environmental accidents: what you see is what you get," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 157-173, January.
- Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Feess, E. & Hege, U., 2000.
"Safety Monitoring, Capital Structure, and "Financial Responsibility","
2000-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Feess, Eberhard & Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Safety monitoring, capital structure, and "financial responsibility"," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 323-339, September.
- Henry van Egteren & R. Smith & Dean McAfee, 2004. "Harmonization of Environmental Regulations When Firms are Judgment Proof," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 139-164, March.
- Garmon, Christopher, 2005. "A Note on Negligence and Collusion-Proof Liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 256-263, June.
- Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal negligence rule under limited liability," Economics Working Papers 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004.
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