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The Benefits of Extended Liability

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Author Info
Hiriart, Yolande
Martimort, David
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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 334.

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Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision: Jun 2005
Publication status: Published in The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, n°2, octobre 2006, p. 562-582.[ Texte complet ]
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:560

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pitchford, Rohan, 1995. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1171-86, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Boyd, James & Ingberman, Daniel E, 1997. "The Search for Deep Pockets: Is "Extended Liability" Expensive Liability?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 232-58, April.
  3. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1995. "Environmental Protection, Producer Insolvency and Lender Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-50, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 2001. "Optimal Contracting with Private Knowledge of Wealth and Ability," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 68(1), pages 21-44, January.
  6. Rohan Pitchford, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 739-745, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Newman, Harry A. & Wright, David W., 1990. "Strict liability in a principal-agent model," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 219-231, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2004. "Modelling the choice between regulation and liability in terms of social welfare," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(3), pages 590-612, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Heyes, Anthony G, 1996. "Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 311-23, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Boyd, James, 2001. "Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," Discussion Papers dp-01-42, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  11. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Economic Analysis of Law," NBER Working Papers 6960, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Dieter Balkenborg, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 731-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1995. "Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 319-336, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington, 2001. "How Liable Should a Lender Be? The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 724-730, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. " Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-87, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 2000. "Contracting with Wealth-Constrained Agents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 743-67, August.
  17. Charles M. Kahn & Dilip Mookherjee, 1998. "Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(3), pages 443-465, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Segerson, Kathleen & Tietenberg, Tom, 1992. "The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement: An economic analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 179-200, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1994. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-22, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Dionne, Georges & Spaeter, Sandrine, 2003. "Environmental risk and extended liability: The case of green technologies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1025-1060, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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