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Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks

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Laffont, Jean-Jacques

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 58 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 319-336
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:58:y:1995:i:3:p:319-336

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Carsten Helm & Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 154, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
  2. HIRIART, Yolande & MARTIMORT, David, 2004. "Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 256, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  3. Carsten Helm, 2005. "How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 153, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
  4. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2000. "Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-57, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  5. HIRIART, Yolande & MARTIMORT, David, 2004. "The Benefits of Extended Liability," IDEI Working Papers 334, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
  6. Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Antonia Morga, 2004. "Export Credit Gurantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality," Studies in Economics 0402, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
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