Recently, U.S. environmental law has shown a tendency toward increased lender liability. A model of a potentially judgment-proof owner of a firm, a lender, and a potential victim is developed in which this policy can increase accident frequency and reduce efficiency. Full, partial, and zero lender-liability rules and a minimum equity requirement are analyzed. Partial lender liability and an equivalent minimum equity requirement deliver the highest level of efficiency, although the former can deliver a higher contribution by the lender to the victim than the latter. Policy and empirical implications are also discussed. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 85 (1995) Issue (Month): 5 (December) Pages: 1171-86 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Che, Yeon-Koo & Spier, Kathryn, 2006.
"Strategic Judgment Proofing,"
MPRA Paper
6100, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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