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Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax

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  • Eef Delhaye

    (K.U.Leuven-Center for Economic Studies)

Abstract

Policy makers can improve traffic safety by the use of different instruments. These instruments include regulation (e.g. speed limits, vehicle standards, etc.), enforcement of regulation, liability rules, physical measures (e.g. roundabouts, speed humps, etc.), economic instruments (pricing of transport, insurance pricing), education and sensitisation. In this paper we focus on two specific determinants of accidents: speed and the number of kilometres people drive. If there is no government intervention, people do not take into account the full cost of their driving and they will drive too fast and too much. In our setting, the government can use three instruments to influence the behaviour of people: speed limits, strict liability and a kilometre tax. We set up a theoretical model of traffic accidents to analyse the choice of the speed level and the number of kilometres under the different instruments and determine the optimal combinations. Given our assumptions we never reach the social optimum. To illustrate our results we discuss a numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • Eef Delhaye, 2004. "Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0407, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    • Handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0407
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    File URL: https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/119356/1/ETE-WP-2004-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peirson, John & Skinner, Ian & Vickerman, Roger, 1998. "The Microeconomic Analysis of the External Costs of Road Accidents," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 429-440, August.
    2. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the joint use of liability and safety regulation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
    3. Burrows, Paul, 1999. "Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 227-244, June.
    4. Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1088-1108, October.
    5. John Peirson & Ian Skinner & Roger Vickerman, 1998. "The Microeconomic Analysis of the External Costs of Road Accidents," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 429-440, August.
    6. Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 1998. "Road Transport Externalities," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 335-348, April.
    7. Steven Shavell, 1983. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety," NBER Working Papers 1218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Delhaye, E., 2006. "Traffic safety: Speed limits, strict liability and a km tax," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 205-226, March.

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    Keywords

    transport; law and economic; liability; regulation; accidents;
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