Traffic safety: speed limits, strict liability and a km tax
AbstractPolicy makers can improve traffic safety by the use of different instruments. These instruments include regulation (e.g. speed limits, vehicle standards, etc.), enforcement of regulation, liability rules, physical measures (e.g. roundabouts, speed humps, etc.), economic instruments (pricing of transport, insurance pricing), education and sensitisation. In this paper we focus on two specific determinants of accidents: speed and the number of kilometres people drive. If there is no government intervention, people do not take into account the full cost of their driving and they will drive too fast and too much. In our setting, the government can use three instruments to influence the behaviour of people: speed limits, strict liability and a kilometre tax. We set up a theoretical model of traffic accidents to analyse the choice of the speed level and the number of kilometres under the different instruments and determine the optimal combinations. Given our assumptions we never reach the social optimum. To illustrate our results we discuss a numerical example.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment in its series Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series with number ete0407.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven
Phone: +32-(0)16-32 67 25
Fax: +32-(0)16-32 67 96
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/energmil
More information through EDIRC
transport; law and economic; liability; regulation; accidents;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Peirson & Ian Skinner & Roger Vickerman, 1996.
"The Microeconomic Analysis of the External Costs of Road Accidents,"
Studies in Economics
9606, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- Peirson, John & Skinner, Ian & Vickerman, Roger, 1998. "The Microeconomic Analysis of the External Costs of Road Accidents," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(259), pages 429-40, August.
- Burrows, Paul, 1999. "Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 227-244, June.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000.
"On the joint use of liability and safety regulation,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 371-382, September.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Steven Shavell, 1983. "Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety," NBER Working Papers 1218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shavell, Steven, 1991.
"Specific versus General Enforcement of Law,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1088-1108, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Isabelle) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Isabelle to update the entry or send us the correct address.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.