This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm : Complete Characterization

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ram Singh (Delhi School of Economics)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A liability rule determines whether and how much damage (liability) payments are to be made by the injurer(s) to the victim(s) of an accident. Damage awards are critical for the efficiency or otherwise of liability rules. One of the factors affecting damage awards and, as a consequence, efficiency characteristics of liability rules is the errors made by courts in estimation of the harm suffered by the victims. In this paper efficiency properties of liability rules when courts make errors in estimation of the harm are studied. Effects of courts' errors on parties' behaviour regarding the levels of care they take to prevent the accident are analyzed. A condition called negligent injurer's liability is introduced. When courts make upper-biased errors, condition negligent injurer's liability is shown to be necessary and sufficient condition for a liability rule to be efficient. The notion of simple liability rules is also introduced and discussed. Analysis is carried out in a quite broader framework. In particular, the standard assumption that costs of care and expected loss functions are such that total social costs of accident are minimized at a unique configuration of care levels is relaxed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cdedse.org/papers/13feb/Work99.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 99.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:99

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Delhi 110 007
Phone: (011) 27667005
Fax: (011) 27667159
Email:
Web page: http://www.cdedse.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.cdedse.org/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Vinayan. K.P).

Related research
Keywords: Court's errors efficient damages liability rules simple liability rules total social costs efficient liability rules negligent injurer's liability Nash equilibrium.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and signaling," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 323-345, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," NBER Working Papers 4203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1996. "Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages," NBER Working Papers 4287, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 306-20, April.
    Other versions:
  5. Steven Shavell, 1980. "Strict Liability Versus Negligence," NBER Reprints 0084, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Louis Kaplow, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules," NBER Working Papers 3958, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
  8. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
  9. Kaplow, Louis, 1994. "The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 307-401, January.
  10. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-63, April.
  11. Miceli, Thomas J, 1990. "Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 189-201, Spring.
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also covers the most complete directory of Economics departments and institutes, EDIRC.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.