Accuracy in the Determination of Liability
AbstractMany legal rules, notably rules of procedure and evidence, are concerned with achieving accuracy in the outcome of adjudication. In this article, we study accuracy in the conventional model of law enforcement. We consider why reducing error in determining liability is socially valuable and how error and its reduction affect the optimal probability and magnitude of sanctions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4203.
Date of creation: Oct 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 1-15, (April 1994).
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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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Other versions of this item:
- Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, April.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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