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Optimal Prosecution of Defendants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain

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Author Info
Miceli, Thomas J

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 6 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 189-201
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:1:p:189-201

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  1. Ram Singh, 2001. "Effects of Courts' Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 97, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anthony Heyes, 1994. "Environmental enforcement when ‘inspectability’ is endogenous: A model with overshooting properties," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(5), pages 479-494, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lando, Henrik, 2000. "The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter," Working Papers 2000-7, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance. [Downloadable!]
  4. Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence," Working papers 2003-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ezra Friedman & Abraham Wickelgren, . "Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1008, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav, & Mark Ramseyer, 2008. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice," Working Papers 2008-16, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2008. "The Economics of Search Warrants," Emory Economics 0810, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
  8. Derek Pyne, 2004. "Can Making It Harder to Convict Criminals Ever Reduce Crime?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 191-201, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Christoph Engel, 2008. "Preponderance of the Evidence versus Intime Conviction. A Behavioural Perspective on a Conflict between American and Continental European Law," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008_33, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  10. Ram Singh, 2001. "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm : Complete Characterization," Working papers 99, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Richard Adelstein & Thomas Miceli, 2001. "Toward a Comparative Economics of Plea Bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 47-67, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Kenneth Ayotte & Hayong Yun, . "Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1018, American Law & Economics Association. [Downloadable!]
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