Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Comparative Vigilance

Contents:

Author Info

  • Allan M. Feldman

    (Department of Economics, Brown University Providence, RI 02906 USA)

  • Ram Singh

    (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India)

Abstract

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparative vigilance. We devise rules that are efficient and that reward vigilance. It is commonly believed that discontinuous liability shares are necessary for efficiency. However we develop a liability rule, which we call the “super-symmetric rule,” that is both efficient and continuous, that is based on comparative negligence when both parties are negligent and on comparative vigilance when both parties are vigilant, and that is always responsive to increased care. Moreover, our super-symmetric rule divides accident losses into two parts: one part creates incentives for efficiency; the other part provides equity.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cdedse.org/pdf/work173.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics in its series Working papers with number 173.

as in new window
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:173

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Delhi 110 007
Phone: (011) 27667005
Fax: (011) 27667159
Email:
Web page: http://www.cdedse.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.cdedse.org/

Related research

Keywords: Comparative vigilance; equity; economic efficiency; tort liability rules; Nash equilibrium; social costs; pure comparative vigilance; super-symmetric rule;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Single Activity Accidents," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 107-164, January.
  2. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  3. Lowe, Vaughan, 2007. "International Law," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199268849, September.
  4. Yu-Ping Liao & Michelle J. White, 2002. "No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 258-294.
  5. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 433-469, August.
  6. Miceli, Thomas J., 1996. "Cause in fact, proximate cause, and the hand rule: Extending Grady's positive economic theory of negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 473-482, December.
  7. Francesco Parisi, 2004. "Comparative Causation," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 345-368.
  8. Kim, Jeonghyun & Feldman, Allan M., 2006. "Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 455-477, December.
  9. Marks, Stephen, 1994. "Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 287-301, January.
  10. Feldman, Allan M. & Frost, John M., 1998. "A simple model of efficient tort liability rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 201-215, June.
  11. Jeonghyun Kim, 2004. "A Complete Characterization of Efficient Liability Rules: Comment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 61-75, 01.
  12. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2009. "Comparative Vigilance," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
  13. Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, 2002. "The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered," Working Papers 2002-27, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  14. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-47, June.
  15. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, September.
  16. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-63, April.
  17. Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, 2005. "The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 523-543.
  18. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Ram Singh & Allan M. Feldman, 2010. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers id:2682, eSocialSciences.
  2. Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010. "The Efficiency of Comparative Causation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
  3. FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  4. Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide," Working Papers 2008-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:173. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sanjeev Sharma).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.