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The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules

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Author Info
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci ()
Gerrit de Geest ()

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Abstract

Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show under what conditions the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that entirely burden one party. Our analysis applies to comparative negligence, communal liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for non-verifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and to the distribution of shares in partnerships.

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Paper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-17.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0417

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Related research
Keywords: comparative negligence; law enforcement; divorce; employment contracts; theory of the firm.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability

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  8. Orr, Daniel, 1991. "The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 119-29, January.
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  12. Richard A. Posner, 1979. "A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Law," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 7, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
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  13. Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Accident Law and Resource Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 366-405, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Shavell, Steven, 1985. "Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 587-609, October.
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  15. Edlin, Aaron S., 1994. "Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 21-34, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. De Geest, Gerrit & Siegers, Jacques & Vandenberghe, Ann-Sophie, 2001. "The expectation measure, labor contracts, and the incentive to work hard," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Curran, Christopher, 1992. "The spread of the comparative negligence rule in the United States," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 317-332, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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