The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules
AbstractSharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show under what conditions the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that entirely burden one party. Our analysis applies to comparative negligence, communal liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for non-verifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and to the distribution of shares in partnerships.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 04-17.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 80125, NL-3508 TC Utrecht
Phone: +31 30 253 9800
Fax: +31 30 253 7373
Web page: http://www.uu.nl/EN/faculties/leg/organisation/schools/schoolofeconomicsuse/Pages/default.aspx
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-10-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2005-10-29 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-10-29 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Emons, Winand, 1990. "Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 89-104, June.
- P. A. Diamond, 1973.
"Single Activity Accidents,"
113, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Sloan, Frank A & Reilly, Bridget A & Schenzler, Christoph, 1995. "Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 49-77, April.
- Jerry Green, 1976. "On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(2), pages 553-574, Autumn.
- Posner, Richard A, 1980.
"A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
- Richard A. Posner, 1979. "A Theory of Primitive Society with Special Reference to Law," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 7, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Low, Stuart & Smith, Janet Kiholm, 1995. "Decisions to Retain Attorneys and File Lawsuits: An Examination of the Comparative Negligence Rule in Accident Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 535-57, June.
- Kornhauser, Lewis A & Revesz, Richard L, 1990. "Apportioning Damages among Potentially Insolvent Actors," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 617-51, June.
- Chung, T.Y., 1992.
"Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis,"
UWO Department of Economics Working Papers
9215, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1993. "Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 395-404, June.
- Steven Shavell, 2003.
"Economic Analysis of Accident Law,"
NBER Working Papers
9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emons,Winand & Sobel,Joel, 1988.
"On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
212, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Emons, Winand & Sobel, Joel, 1991. "On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents Are Not Identical," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 375-90, April.
- Aaron S. Edlin., 1993.
"Efficient Standards of Due Care: Should Courts Find More Parties Negligent Under Comparative Negligence?,"
Economics Working Papers
93-218, University of California at Berkeley.
- Edlin, Aaron S., 1994. "Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 21-34, March.
- Orr, Daniel, 1991. "The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 119-29, January.
- Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
- Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 433-469, August.
- Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Accident Law and Resource Allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 366-405, Autumn.
- Shavell, Steven, 1985.
"Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 587-609, October.
- Steven Shavell, 1983. "Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability," NBER Working Papers 1219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- De Geest, Gerrit & Siegers, Jacques & Vandenberghe, Ann-Sophie, 2001. "The expectation measure, labor contracts, and the incentive to work hard," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-21, March.
- Curran, Christopher, 1992. "The spread of the comparative negligence rule in the United States," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 317-332, September.
- Lando, Henrik & Shavell, Steven, 2004. "The advantage of focusing law enforcement effort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 209-218, June.
- Parisi, Francesco & Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, 2004. "The rise and fall of communal liability in ancient law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 489-505, December.
- Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, 1975.
"On the Assignment of Liability: The Uniform Case,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 487-516, Autumn.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thijs Knaap).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.