Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide

Contents:

Author Info

Abstract

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard comparative negligence rule. Unlike standard liability rules, however, when both parties are vigilant (i.e., taking more care than is efficient), the rule provides for liability shares that depend on the parties’ degrees of vigilance. Moreover, when one party is negligent and the other is non-negligent, our rule provides for variable liability shares, that respond to both carefulness and carelessness of the parties. Our liability rule is equitable; it has no discontinuity at the efficient point where both parties are just meeting their standards of care; and it provides incentives that guarantee the injurer and victim will choose the efficient care levels. This paper does not include theorems and proofs; rather it explains the results with the aid of a simple example, laid out in an easy 3 x 3 table.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Papers/2008/2008-11_paper.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2008-11.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-11

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

Related research

Keywords: Comparative vigilance; equity; economic efficiency; tort liability rules; Nash equilibrium; social costs; pure comparative vigilance; super-symmetric rule;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rea, Samuel Jr., 1987. "The economics of comparative negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 149-162, December.
  2. Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Allan M. Feldman & Jeonghyun Kim, 2002. "The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2002-27, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics 173, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
  5. Peter A. Diamond, 1974. "Single Activity Accidents," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 107-164, January.
  6. Francesco Parisi, 2004. "Comparative Causation," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 345-368.
  7. Jeonghyun Kim, 2004. "A Complete Characterization of Efficient Liability Rules: Comment," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 81(1), pages 61-75, 01.
  8. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, 2003. "The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 433-469, August.
  9. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-63, April.
  10. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, October.
  11. Feldman, Allan M. & Frost, John M., 1998. "A simple model of efficient tort liability rules," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 201-215, June.
  12. Miceli, Thomas J., 1996. "Cause in fact, proximate cause, and the hand rule: Extending Grady's positive economic theory of negligence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 473-482, December.
  13. Lowe, Vaughan, 2007. "International Law," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780199268849, October.
  14. Kim, Jeonghyun & Feldman, Allan M., 2006. "Victim or injurer, small car or SUV: Tort liability rules under role-type uncertainty," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 455-477, December.
  15. Marks, Stephen, 1994. "Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 287-301, January.
  16. Kahan, Marcel, 1989. "Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 427-47, June.
  17. Yu-Ping Liao & Michelle J. White, 2002. "No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 258-294.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2008-11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Brown Economics Webmaster).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.