No-Fault for Motor Vehicles: An Economic Analysis
AbstractThis article compares incentives and efficiency under the pure tort system (the comparative negligence rule) to those under pure and mixed no-fault systems. Under no-fault systems, drivers are allowed to opt out of no-fault and file lawsuits if their damages exceed a certain threshold. We find that no single liability system always dominates on efficiency grounds, but the pure tort system does best when costs of care are low, and pure no-fault does best when costs of care are high. Choice systems, in which drivers choose between no-fault or pure tort systems, lead to less efficient results because drivers choose the pure tort rule too often. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal American Law and Economics Review.
Volume (Year): 4 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://www.aler.oupjournals.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ram Singh, 2009.
American Law and Economics Review,
Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 134-161.
- Ram Singh & Allan M. Feldman, 2010. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers id:2682, eSocialSciences.
- Allan M. Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance," Working papers 173, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance," Working Papers 2008-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Allan M Feldman & Ram Singh, 2008. "Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide," Working Papers 2008-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Ram Singh, 2008.
"On The Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules,"
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria Under Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 12625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ram Singh, 2006. "On the Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria under Liability Rules," Working papers 150, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Parisi Francesco & Singh Ram, 2010.
"The Efficiency of Comparative Causation,"
Review of Law & Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 219-245, September.
- Michelle J. White, 2002. "The "Arms Race" on American Roads: The Effect of Heavy Vehicles on Traffic Safety and the Failure of Liability Rules," NBER Working Papers 9302, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ram Singh, 2005. "Comparative Causation -- A Re-examination," Working papers 139, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- FRANCESCO PARISI & Ram Singh, 2009. "Efficiency Of Equilibria Under Comparative Causation," Working papers 179, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.