Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.
Volume (Year): 16 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100264
court errors; liability rules; simple liability rules; total social costs; efficient liability rules; negligent injurer's liability; Nash equilibrium;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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