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Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages

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Author Info
Kaplow, Louis
Shavell, Steven

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Abstract

Assessment of damages is a principal issue in litigation and, in light of this, we consider the social justification for, and the private benefits of, accurate measurement of harm. Greater accuracy induces injurers to exercise levels of precaution that better reflect the magnitude of the harm they are likely to generate, and, relatedly, it stimulates uninformed injurers to learn about risks before acting. However, accuracy in assessment of harm cannot influence the behavior of injurers--and is therefore of no social value--to the degree that they lack knowledge of the harm they might cause when deciding on their precautions. Regardless of the social value of accuracy, litigants generally gain by devoting resources toward proof of damages, leading often to socially excessive private incentives to establish damages. Copyright 1996 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 191-210
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:39:y:1996:i:1:p:191-210

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
  2. Png, I. P. L., 1986. "Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 101-105, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," NBER Working Papers 4203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kaplow, Louis & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Private versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 306-20, April.
    Other versions:
  6. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
  7. Kaplow, Louis, 1995. "A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 150-63, April.
  8. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ram Singh, 2001. "Effects of Courts' Errors on Efficiency of Liability Rules: When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed," Working papers 97, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Tim Friehe, 2007. "On the incentive effects of damage averaging in tort law," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and Negligence Rule," Economics Working Papers 666, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ram Singh, 2003. "Efficiency of 'Simple' Liability Rules When Courts Make Erroneous Estimation of the Damage," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 39-58, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "Judicial Fact Discretion," NBER Working Papers 12679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Xinyu Hua & Kathryn E. Spier, 2004. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," NBER Working Papers 10943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ram Singh, 2008. "Efficient Liability Rules When Courts Make Errors in Estimation of the Harm: Complet Characterization," Working Papers id:1612, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Alessandro Stanziani, 2004. "Wine Reputation and Quality Controls: The Origin of the AOCs in 19th Century France," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 149-167, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Boyd, James, 1996. "Banking on "Green Money:" Are Environmental Financial Responsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promise?," Discussion Papers dp-96-26, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  10. Tadashi Ito, 2007. "NAFTA and productivity convergence between Mexico and the US," HEI Working Papers 26-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 09 Jun 2009. [Downloadable!]
  11. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," MPRA Paper 12536, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Francesco Parisi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2003. "The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis," Working Papers 03-13, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. repec:bep:dewple:2002-1-1048 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Giovanni Immordino & Michele Polo, 2008. "Judicial Errors and Innovative Activity," CSEF Working Papers 196, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 18 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit de Geest, 2003. "Judgement Proofness under Four Different Precaution Technologies," Working Papers 03-16, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2005. "Contributory Infringement Rule and Patents," Staff General Research Papers 12268, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Harald Hau & Marcel Thum, 2000. "Lawyers, Legislation and Social Welfare," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 231-254, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2005. "A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies," NBER Working Papers 11227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. repec:bep:dewple:2006-1-1140 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. repec:bep:eapcon:v:3:y:2004:i:1:p:1202-1202 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Dietrich Earnhart, 1998. "Civil Litigation, Access to Government-Held Information, and Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement in the Czech Republic," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-141, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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