This paper analyzes the cost and incentive properties of the standard of proof for a finding of negligence. In common law, the usual standard is for courts to decide on the basis of a so-called balance of probabilities or preponderance of the evidence. We show that, if producing information about defendants' behavior is socially costly, preponderance of the evidence is the only cost-and-incentive efficient standard of proof consistent with a negligence rule.
Cet article analyse les propriétés d'efficience du standard ou degré de preuve requis pour un jugement en responsabilité civile. Dans la common law, le tribunal décide selon la balance des probabilités en fonction du principe de la prépondérance de la preuve. Nous montrons que, si la production d'information sur le comportement du défendeur est socialement coûteuse, ce standard de preuve est le seul qui soit efficace sur le plan coûts-incitations dans un contexte de reponsabilité pour faute.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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