1. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
2. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
5. Hyun Song Shin, 1998. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 378-405, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2000. "Appealing Judgments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(3), pages 502-526, Autumn.
8. Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Bernardo & Eric L. Talley & Ivo Welch, 1999. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm118, Yale School of Management. [Downloadable!]
9. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    • Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2004. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 433, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    • Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 749, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
12. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
13. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 2000. "On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 365-94, October.
14. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 1992. "Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships," Discussion Papers 991R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
16. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1994. "An Economic Model of Legal Discovery," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 435-63, January.
17. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Robson, Alexander R. W. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2002. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2005. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," ANUCBE School of Economics Working Papers 2005-455, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Alex Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 109-128, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-02, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
3. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Working Papers 0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. repec:att:wimass:1920123 is not listed on IDEAS
5. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
6. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2007. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2006. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0633, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
7. LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Incentives and the Search for Unknown Resources such as Water," IDEI Working Papers 169, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
8. Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
9. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact Finding," Working Papers 0612, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    • Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2004. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 433, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    • Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2003. "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1055-1055. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
13. Juan-Jose Ganuza & Fernando Gomez, 2007. "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(3), pages 3. [Downloadable!] (restricted)