IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/pbu77.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Jesse L. Bull

Personal Details

First Name:Jesse
Middle Name:L.
Last Name:Bull
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbu77
http://faculty.fiu.edu/~bullj/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Florida International University

Miami, Florida (United States)
http://economics.fiu.edu/
RePEc:edi:defiuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Jesse Bull, 2022. "Interrogation and Disclosure of Evidence," Working Papers 2212, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  2. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  3. Jesse Bull, 2013. "Interrogation and Evidence Fabrication," Working Papers 1303, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
  4. Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2004. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 433, Econometric Society.
  5. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

Articles

  1. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
  2. Jesse Bull, 2012. "Third-Party Budget Breakers and Side Contracting in Team Production," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2606-2614.
  3. Jesse Bull, 2009. "Costly Evidence And Systems Of Fact‐Finding," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 103-125, April.
  4. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
  5. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
  6. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
  7. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Aditya Kuvalekar & João Ramos & Johannes Schneider, 2023. "The wrong kind of information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(2), pages 360-384, June.
    2. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 2108, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    3. Aditya Kuvalekar & Jo~ao Ramos & Johannes Schneider, 2021. "The Wrong Kind of Information," Papers 2111.04172, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    4. Lundberg, Alexander & Mungan, Murat, 2022. "The effect of evidentiary rules on conviction rates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 563-576.
    5. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2018. "Adversarial Persuasion with Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 1811, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.

  2. Jesse Bull, 2013. "Interrogation and Evidence Fabrication," Working Papers 1303, Florida International University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.

  3. Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2004. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 433, Econometric Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2013. "Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-003, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Sergiu Hart & Ilan Kremer & Motty Perry, 2015. "Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment," Discussion Paper Series dp684, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    3. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2016. "Optimal Allocation With Ex-Post Verification And Limited Penalties," Working Papers 2016_21, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    4. Itai Sher & Rakesh Vohra, 2011. "Price Discrimination Through Communication," Discussion Papers 1536, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2017. "Mechanisms with Evidence: Commitment and Robustness," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2017-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    6. Navin Kartik & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Implementation with Evidence," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754592, HAL.
    7. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 17011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    8. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Certification and Market Transparency," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2014-041, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    9. Koessler, Frederic & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2019. "Selling with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    10. Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Post-Print halshs-01503765, HAL.
    11. Andrew Clausen, 2013. "Moral Hazard with Counterfeit Signals," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 225, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    12. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
    13. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Communication Games with Optional Verification," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01490688, HAL.
    14. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    15. Cotton, Christopher, 2012. "Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 369-386.
    16. Joshua S. Gans, 2019. "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    18. ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    19. Gorkem Celik, 2015. "Implementation by Gradual Revelation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 271-296, June.
    20. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    21. Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2019. "Evidence Reading Mechanisms," SciencePo Working papers Main halshs-02302036, HAL.
    22. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
    23. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 904, Barcelona School of Economics.
    24. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt63s1s3j6, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    25. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018. "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 133, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    26. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    27. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
    28. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2017. "Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 47, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    29. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
    30. Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen & Yifei Sun, 2021. "Direct Implementation with Evidence," Papers 2105.12298, arXiv.org, revised May 2023.
    31. Peralta, Esteban, 2019. "Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-72.
    32. Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Competition for Access and Full Revelation of Evidence," Working Papers 2010-12, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    33. Ayça Özdoðan, 2016. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion," Bogazici Journal, Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21.
    34. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," Post-Print halshs-00754650, HAL.
    35. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    36. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    37. Halac, Marina & Yared, Pierre, 2018. "Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    38. Bharat Anand & Ron Shachar, 2007. "(Noisy) communication," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 211-237, September.
    39. Francisco Silva, 2020. "Self-evaluations," Documentos de Trabajo 554, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    40. Banerjee, Soumen & Chen, Yi-Chun & Sun, Yifei, 0. "Direct implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    41. Anton Kolotilin, 2013. "Experimental Design to Persuade," Discussion Papers 2013-17, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    42. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
    43. Geoffrey A. Chua & Gaoji Hu & Fang Liu, 2023. "Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 455-488, October.
    44. Evans, R., Reiche, S. & Reiche, S., 2022. "When is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2222, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    45. Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
    46. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    47. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
    48. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    49. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000012, UCLA Department of Economics.
    50. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    51. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    52. Blanes i Vidal, Jordi & Möller, Marc, 2013. "Decision-making and implementation in teams," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51544, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    53. Soumen Banerjee & Yi-Chun Chen, 2022. "Implementation with Uncertain Evidence," Papers 2209.10741, arXiv.org.
    54. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics.
    55. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
    56. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
    57. Albin Erlanson & Andreas Kleiner, 2019. "Costly Verification in Collective Decisions," Papers 1910.13979, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2020.
    58. Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    59. Silva, Francisco, 2019. "Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    60. Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    61. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.
    62. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.

  4. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19p7z2gm, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

    Cited by:

    1. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2004. "Endogenous Verifiability in Relational Contracting," Discussion Papers 2004/20, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    2. Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," FMG Discussion Papers dp371, Financial Markets Group.
    3. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2m08n7cg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    4. Faure-Grimaud Antoine & Laffont Jean-Jacques & Martimort David, 2003. "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, January.
    5. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2006. "Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0633, CIRPEE.
    6. Tore Ellingsen & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2011. "Financial Contracting Under Imperfect Enforcement," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 323-371.
    7. Thomas Groll & Anja Prummer, 2016. "Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks," Working Papers 808, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    8. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2014. "Certification and Market Transparency," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2014-041, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    9. Miyazawa, Shinjiro, 2012. "Optimal borrowing structure: An explanation for the multiplicity of large-share creditors and the differentiation among them," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 434-453.
    10. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2018. "Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 385-421, March.
    11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Lipman, Barton L., 2012. "Implementation with partial provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1689-1724.
    12. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print halshs-01509602, HAL.
    13. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    14. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Should We Tax or Cap Political Contributions? A Lobbying Model with Policy Favors and Access," Working Papers 0901, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    15. Cotton, Christopher, 2012. "Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 369-386.
    16. Joshua S. Gans, 2019. "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers 25443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    18. Ganuza Juan-Jose & Gomez Fernando, 2006. "Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and the Negligence Rule," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 365-397, January.
    19. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    20. ,, 2014. "Persuasion and dynamic communication," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    21. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2003. "Incentives and the Search for Unknown Resources such as Water," IDEI Working Papers 2, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    22. Watson, Joel & Brennan, Jim, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4242n025, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    23. PRAM, Kym, 2017. "Hard evidence and welfare in adverse selection environments," Economics Working Papers MWP 2017/10, European University Institute.
    24. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
    25. Salvador Barberà & Antonio Nicolò, 2016. "Information Disclosure under Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions," Working Papers 904, Barcelona School of Economics.
    26. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt63s1s3j6, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    27. Alexander R. W. Robson & Stergios Skaperdas, 2002. "Costly Enforcement of Property Rights and the Coase Theorem," CESifo Working Paper Series 762, CESifo.
    28. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    29. Hideshi Itoh, 2023. "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 333-354, July.
    30. Christopher Cotton, 2008. "Access Fees in Politics," Working Papers 0903, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    31. Raphael Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning more by doing less," Working Papers 2012-1, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    32. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez-Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Post-Print halshs-01053478, HAL.
    33. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Pay-to-Play Politics: Informational lobbying and campaign finance reform when contributions buy access," Working Papers 2010-22, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    34. Jesse Bull, 2012. "Third-Party Budget Breakers and Side Contracting in Team Production," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2606-2614.
    35. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2008. "Strategic communication networks," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586847, HAL.
    36. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
    37. Christopher Cotton, 2009. "Competition for Access and Full Revelation of Evidence," Working Papers 2010-12, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    38. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion," THEMA Working Papers 2006-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    39. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2020. "Project selection with partially verifiable information," Papers 2007.00907, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2022.
    40. Aurélie Slechten, 2015. "Environmental agreements under asymmetric information," Working Papers 95042257, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    41. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Barton L. Lipman, 2009. "Implementation and Partial Provability," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2009-002, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    42. Surajeet Chakravarty & Miltiadis Makris, 2012. "Designing Incentives under Multidimensional Performance Measures," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(4), pages 687-711, December.
    43. Deneckere,R. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Mechanism design and communication costs," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    44. Chris William Sanchirico, 2008. "A Primary-Activity Approach to Proof Burdens," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(1), pages 273-313, January.
    45. Jesse Bull, 2009. "Costly Evidence And Systems Of Fact‐Finding," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 103-125, April.
    46. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2015. "The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-39.
    47. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond, 2012. "Incentive provision when contracting is costly," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2012/16, University of Stavanger.
    48. Azacis, Helmuts & Vida, Peter, 2021. "Fighting Collusion: An Implementation Theory Approach," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2021/19, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    49. Dubra, Juan & Caffera, Marcelo & Figueroa, Nicolás, 2016. "Mechanism Design when players' Preferences and information coincide," MPRA Paper 75721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    50. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_124, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    51. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2014. "Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption," Working Papers halshs-00922092, HAL.
    52. Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
    53. Roland Strausz, 2016. "Expected Worth for 2 � 2 Matrix Games with Variable Grid Sizes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2040, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    54. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
    55. Christopher Cotton, 2010. "Evidence Revelation in Competitions for Access," Working Papers 2010-21, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    56. Ralph Boleslavsky & Tracy R. Lewis, 2011. "Advocacy and Dynamic Delegation," Working Papers 2011-7, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    57. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7715f08f, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    58. Schwartz, Alan & Watson, Joel, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2wh8m7bv, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    59. Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Disclosure Risk and Price Drift," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 351-379, May.
    60. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    61. Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019. "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," Papers 1908.05556, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    62. Deneckere, Raymond & Severinov, Sergei, 2008. "Mechanism design with partial state verifiability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 487-513, November.
    63. Koray, Semih & Yildiz, Kemal, 2018. "Implementation via rights structures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 479-502.
    64. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
    65. Evans, R., 2006. "Mechanism Design with Renegotiation and Costly Messages," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0626, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    66. Shaofei Jiang, 2019. "Disclosure Games with Large Evidence Spaces," Papers 1910.13633, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.
    67. Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    68. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.
    69. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2014. "Social Accountability: Persuasion and Debate to Contain Corruption," PSE Working Papers halshs-00922092, HAL.
    70. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016. "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 110-134.

Articles

  1. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2019. "Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(4), pages 974-1003, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Jesse Bull, 2012. "Third-Party Budget Breakers and Side Contracting in Team Production," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(3), pages 2606-2614.

    Cited by:

    1. Buzard, Kristy & Watson, Joel, 2010. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3df3q4vg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    2. Watson, Joel & Buzard, Kristy, 2009. "Contract, Renegotiation, and Hold Up: General Results on the Technology of Trade and Investment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt3923q7kz, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    3. Watson, Joel & Wignall, Chris, 2009. "Hold-Up and Durable Trading Opportunities," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt8p8284wg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

  3. Jesse Bull, 2009. "Costly Evidence And Systems Of Fact‐Finding," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 103-125, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    2. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    3. Claude Fluet & Thomas Lanzi, 2021. "Cross-Examination," Cahiers de recherche 2108, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    4. Chulyoung Kim, 2014. "Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures with Information Acquisition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(4), pages 767-803.
    5. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7715f08f, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    6. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.
    7. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.

  4. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-28, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Watson, Joel, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2m08n7cg, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    2. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    3. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    4. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.
    5. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    6. Chris Sanchirico & George Triantis, "undated". "Evidence Arbitrage: The Fabrication of Evidence and the Verifiability of Contract Performance," Scholarship at Penn Law upenn_wps-1005, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
    7. Raymond Deneckere & Sergei Severinov, 2022. "Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1334-1370, August.
    8. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt7715f08f, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    9. Schwartz, Alan & Watson, Joel, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2wh8m7bv, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    10. Yeon-Koo Che & Sergei Severinov, 2017. "Disclosure and Legal Advice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 188-225, May.

  5. Bull Jesse, 2008. "Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-20, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehdi Ayouni & Frédéric Koessler, 2017. "Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion," Post-Print halshs-01503765, HAL.
    2. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2018. "Statistical Evidence and the Problem of Robust Litigation," Working Papers 1801, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    3. Jesse Bull, 2013. "Interrogation and Evidence Fabrication," Working Papers 1303, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    4. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 45, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

  6. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (2) 2018-02-19 2023-01-09
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2013-10-11
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2023-01-09

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Jesse L. Bull should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.