Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

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Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

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Shin, Hyun Song

Abstract

Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a welfare comparison of the two procedures by constructing a game-theoretic model of decision making by an arbitrator in the face of self-interested reporting strategies by the interested parties. Even if it is assumed that the arbitrator is, on average, as well informed as the two opposing parties, the adversarial procedure is strictly superior. The source of this superiority lies in a non-convexity in the adversarial procedure. There are increasing marginal returns to improvements in the information of an interested party. There are no analogous increasing returns to the arbitrator’s information under the inquisitorial procedure.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1722.

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Date of creation: Oct 1997
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1722

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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