1. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   • Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Evidence Discloure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-16r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
3. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Working Papers 0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. repec:att:wimass:1920123 is not listed on IDEAS
7. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
10. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence and Systems of Fact Finding," Working Papers 0612, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
13. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1985. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 749, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
14. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
15. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
16. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(3), pages 447-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2004. "On Optimal Rules of Persuasion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1715-1736, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Jesse Bull, 2006. "Costly Evidence Production and the Limits of Verifiability," Working Papers 0611, Florida International University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. CAILLAUD, Bernard & TIROLE, Jean, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," IDEI Working Papers 435, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Consensus building: How to persuade a group," PSE Working Papers 2006-19, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
   • Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1877-1900, December.
3. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000012, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
5. Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "On the Pragmatics of Persuasion: A Game Theoretical Approach," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000166, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Evidence Discloure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-16r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2000. "Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   • Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)