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Preponderance of Evidence

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  • Dominique Demougin
  • Claude Fluet

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence about injurers' behavior is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the `preponderance of evidence' standard used in common law, together with ordinary exclusion rules defining legally admissible evidence, provides maximal incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care. This holds even though, following the occurrence of harm, litigants have unequal access to evidence and may distort information in adversarial procedures. Abstracting from litigation costs, the optimal assignment of the burden of proof is shown to follow from the principle underlying the standard of proof. Our main results are derived in a mechanism design framework, but we also consider implementation as a sequential equilibrium with the court as a player in the game. Cet article analyse les propriétés incitatives du standard de preuve et de l'attribution de la charge de la preuve en responsabilité pour faute, lorsque l'information sur le comportement de l'auteur du dommage est imparfaite et relève des parties. Nous montrons que le standard de la « prépondérance de preuve » appliqué dans la common law, combiné aux règles d'exclusion définissant les faits admissibles en cour, fournit le maximum d'incitations à la prudence. Cette propriété est vérifiée même si, lorsque survient un dommage, les parties ont un accès inégal aux faits ou peuvent les présenter de manière partiale dans le cadre d'une procédure adversariale. Abstraction faite des coûts de litiges, l'attribution de la charge de la preuve s'explique également par le principe fondant le standard de preuve. Ces résultats sont obtenus comme propriétés d'un mécanisme optimal, mais nous analysons aussi la mise en oeuvre du mécanisme dans un équilibre séquentiel où le tribunal est modélisé comme un joueur.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2002s-61.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2002s-61

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Keywords: Negligence; tort rules; standard of proof; burden of proof; deterrence; Faute; responsabilité; standard de preuve; charge de la preuve; prévention;

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References

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  1. Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Optimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to legal tribunals," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 3-11, June.
  2. Robert Cooter & Winand Emons, 2000. "Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0211, Econometric Society.
  3. Froeb, Luke M & Kobayashi, Bruce H, 1996. "Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret Selectively Produced Evidence?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 257-76, April.
  4. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 2006. "Preponderance of evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 963-976, May.
  5. Daniel J. Seidmann & Eyal Winter, 1997. "Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(1), pages 163-170, January.
  6. Hylton, Keith N, 1990. "Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 433-52, Fall.
  7. Bernardo, Antonio E & Talley, Eric & Welch, Ivo, 2000. "A Theory of Legal Presumptions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-49, April.
  8. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," NBER Working Papers 4203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Sanchirico, Chris William, 1997. "The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 431-447, September.
  10. Schauer, Frederick & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1996. "On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-52, January.
  11. Hay, Bruce L & Spier, Kathryn E, 1997. "Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 413-31, June.
  12. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
  13. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1989. "Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 99-108, Spring.
  14. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
  15. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 2000. "On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 365-94, October.
  16. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
  17. Davis, Michael L, 1994. "The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal Disputes," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 343-59, October.
  18. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 275-293, June.
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